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 In an analysis of the aesthetic situation, painting must surely offer the clearest paradigm.  
The presence of a specific object that can usually be located with reasonable clarity, of a viewer 
who attends to it, and both in a setting that encourages focused experiences, would seem to be 
a model for the conditions under which aesthetic perception takes place.  While questions can 
be raised on all sides about the actions, reactions, and contributions of each element in the 
situation, its structure seems to shine through with a clarity all the more appealing in discussions 
of a subject that carries more than its own share of obscurity.  The one disconcerting factor in 
this comfortable equilibrium comes from the uncertain nature of the key relation here, that of the 
viewer and the object. 
 
 In "Art and Its Spectators,"  (JAAC, XLV/1 (Fall 1886), 5-17), David Carrier offers us a 
lucid assessment of various ways in which that relation has figured among some recent 
commentators, most of whom are art historians.  He discovers a continuum of four stages, a  
sequence that ranges on the one end from the classical Albertian account of Gombrich, in which 
the spectator stands before the work in a one-way perspectival relation to the painting, to 
Foucault, who denies that the picture is seen.  Between these poles he distributes two 
intermediates:  Steinberg, who finds a reciprocal relation between spectator and painting, and 
Fried, who eliminates an external, separated spectator entirely (p.6).  This order elaborates a 
fundamental opposition which Carrier obtains from Svetlana Alpers between Albertian and non-
Albertian art, that is, between art in which space is constructed on the basis of linear 
perspective that begins at the eye of the spectator, and art that in one fashion or another denies 
this. 
 
 We can be grateful for every effort to detect order in this most puzzling of circumstances, 
but certainly it should not be at a cost to the subject.  One is tempted to think that this is what 
has occurred here: The acute observations of these commentators have been shaped into an 
appealing but misleading conceptual order.  For not only are the differences among the four not 
as severe as Carrier (or Alpers) would have them; these critics are attempting in piecemeal 
fashion to articulate and support the growing sense that this very aesthetic structure we find so 
attractive is slowly being undermined by the burrowing of historians, shaken under the assaults 
of psychologists of perception, and abandoned by whole regiments of artists.  Let me show, for 
the limited purposes of this discussion, how the four commentators Carrier cited in creating his 
ordered sequence do not fully subscribe to that model and then indicate what this anti-analysis 
suggests. 
 
 Gombrich, to begin, is no true Albertian.  He does not regard the painting as an object of 
the spectator's unidirectional perspectival gaze, of a discriminating but disinterested regard.  In 
fact, one of the major sections of  Art and Illusion examines "The Beholder's Share" in great 
detail.  There and in other writings Gombrich explores various ways in which the viewer 
contributes to what he or she sees.  Gombrich, in fact, is at pains to point out "the beholder's 
share in all reading of spatial arrangement' (Art and Illusion, p. 246), whereas the art of 
perspective errs in wanting "the image to appear like the object and the object like the image" 
(ibid., p. 257).  Gombrich's discussion is replete with references to optical illusions, an 
immediately persuasive type of spectator participation intended to illustrate what often (but not 
invariably) occurs in painting in less bluntly confrontational forms.  Gombrich not only calls on 
such illusions but turns to a variety of other evidence in visual perception to support the same 
point, such as caricatures, portraits, and the experimental work of psychologists like Ames and 
Thouless. 
 
 Steinberg's case suggest something different, the misdirection in construing the 
aesthetic situation as the relation between a viewer and a discrete object.  Carrier's example 
here is a discussion of the Caravaggio’s in the Cerasi Chapel, in which Steinberg argues that 
the placement of the paintings reflects the artist's recognition of the fact that they would be 
viewed from an angle and that the subsequent transference of The Death of the Virgin to the 
Louvre requires knowledge of its original location in order to appreciate it properly.  Carrier 
interprets Steinberg to be calling attention to the interplay of spectator and painting, where the 
art object expands to include its historical background and its architectural surroundings.  
Recognizing the interdependence of painting and spectator acknowledges, however, not just the 
fact of their physical relation but of their mutuality, their reciprocal interplay.  Carrier's reliance of 
the initial assumption of an aesthetic situation structured of essentially discrete elements tends 
to obscure the essential point of Steinberg's discussion, namely that there is a fusion of viewer 
and painting in the Cerasi Chapel, one which literally incorporates them into a single perceptual 
ambiance. 
 
 Fried's intention is to show that this engagement of the viewer is part of the very design 
of certain paintings.  The absorption of the beholder into the painting is a deliberate occurrence 
in certain French art of Diderot's time, in the work of Greuze, for example, as it was in that of 
Courbet and other progressive painters of his day.  Carrier has difficulty accepting this claim and 
tries to show its triviality and impossibility (pp. 9-10), since he seems committed to a viewer who 
must be standing before the painting as a discrete object, the very presupposition these three 
art historians are so painstakingly trying to dispel.  And when he introduces Foucault's 
deconstruction of Las Meninas, in which the painter's gaze forces the spectator to enter the 
painting, while the mirror which shows a reflection of the royal couple throws the location of the 
spectator into confusion an suggests his disappearance, there is interpretive ambiguity here, 
surely the reason so many commentators have been intrigued by this Velasquez.  Part of 
Carrier's difficulty with Foucault, like his uneasiness with Steinberg and Fried, follows from his 
apparent commitment to the idea of a separate and discrete art object, which, ironically, is part 
of the very Albertian heritage these critics are attempting to dispel. 
 
 Casting the issue in terms of "art and its spectators" reflects that presupposition.  A 
spectator is not identical with the aesthetic viewer or beholder, as Gombrich, Steinberg, Fried, 
and Foucault have variously characterized that person.  The spectator occupies a special sort of 
position, a place apart that was so central to the eighteenth century account of aesthetic 
experience.  The classic description was that of Joseph Addison, who characterized Mr. 
Spectator as a person who lives "in the world rather as a spectator of mankind that as one of the 
species . . . without ever meddling with any practical part in life." (The Sir Roger de Coverly 
Papers, No. 1 (1711)) 
 
 For all its clarity and initial plausibility, the traditional model of the aesthetic situation, 
with its discrete viewer and object, is both inadequate and misleading.  Indeed, this model not 
longer holds, if it ever worked at all.  Not only has the viewer entered the painting; the 
boundaries of the painting have themselves extended both to engage the space in front of the 
painting, as in the Cerasi Chapel, and to incorporate the viewer into the picture space, as in 
Courbet.  We might even consider Foucault's disappearance of the spectator as a playful 
rendering of that same point.  What these commentators are showing us, carefully  and in 
convincing detail, is the inadequacy of that classical model, a claim demonstrated in a direct 
manner ever more insistently by the last century of artists, themselves.  These workers in 
perception have increasingly expanded the boundaries of the art object to incorporate its 
perceiver.  They offer us a realm of experience in which art and object are not separate but 
equal, but rather one in which both are fully integrated in to a single perceptual field.  It is a hard 
lesson for an eye guided by custom but, then, good painting never did pander convention. 
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